Summary and conclusions

The 2026 follow‑up study continues the monitoring, conducted in 2022 and 2024, of the societal experiences, trust and current views of Russian speakers living in Finland. The results describe an internally diverse population group, and developments since 2024 have not been in the same direction across all examined areas. Integration and inclusion are examined as multi-dimensional phenomena, and the results obtained regarding trust, political participation and questions related to Russia and security policy also vary depending on the question examined.

It is therefore justified to examine the results question by question rather than condensing them into a single assessment of the relationship between Russian speakers living in Finland and Finnish society. For example, questions concerning the justification of Russia’s military action, economic sanctions, the security impacts of NATO membership, and the closure of the eastern border yield differing response distributions. However, this study has not systematically analysed how these views are connected to integration, belonging to society or institutional trust.

Many results have remained close to the 2024 level, but changes are also visible

The decline observed in 2024 in several indicators concerning inclusion and the assessment of Finnish society did not continue in 2026. The results for comparable statements often remained the same or changed, for the most part, only slightly and in different directions. However, not a single comparable inclusion statement has returned to the 2022 level, when the results were more positive across the board.

Changes in institutional trust were also mostly small and institution‑specific. Clearer declines were seen in assessments concerning acting in an emergency: the proportion of those trusting instructions from the authorities in a crisis fell from 81% to 74%, and the proportion of those ready to contribute to voluntary rescue or relief work from 87% to 73%. The majority nevertheless still viewed both positively.

In topical questions, changes went in different directions. The proportion of those reporting discrimination or hate speech caused by the war in Ukraine and linked to speaking the Russian language rose from 26% to 30% and has increased across all three survey rounds. By contrast, worry about the expansion of the war fell from 58% to 50%, and worry about Russian military actions against Finland also diminished.

The impact of NATO membership on one’s sense of security was assessed as neutral more often than before: 54% considered that membership does not affect the sense of security, whereas in 2024 this proportion was 42%. The proportion of those who consider NATO membership to have a weakening effect on the sense of security fell from 37% to 29%.

The proportion of those considering Russia’s military action in Ukraine justified fell from 13% to 10%. However, the proportion of those rejecting the justification of military action remained at around two‑thirds of respondents. The change was thus reflected more in the growth of the proportion of those not taking a position than of those unequivocally rejecting military action.

At the same time, many key results are very stable. For instance, approximately 72% of respondents want to still be living in Finland ten years from now, practically the same proportion as in 2024.

Attachment to Finland is multi‑dimensional

Integration and inclusion have been examined in this study as multi‑dimensional phenomena. The results illustrate that feeling at home locally, perceiving oneself as part of Finnish society, belonging to the Russian-speaking community, and political agency receive varying assessments.

Of these, feeling at home locally is the strongest: 82% feel at home in their own residential area. Fifty‑nine per cent feel they are part of Finnish society. By contrast, 36% feel they belong to the Russian-speaking community living in Finland. Belonging to the Russian-speaking community is therefore not an experience uniting all those whose registered native language is Russian.
Assessments concerning political agency remain lower. Confidence in their ability to participate in politics in Finland and assessments of Russian speakers’ opportunities to influence political decisions received lower mean scores than almost all other inclusion indicators, and confidence in their ability to participate in politics in particular gathered the largest proportion of respondents who strongly disagreed. The connection of political agency to feeling at home locally and to the experience of belonging to society would require more detailed data analysis, and these connections have not been systematically examined in this report.

Experiences of attachment also vary according to length of residence, proficiency in the Finnish language and citizenship. For example, the experience of being part of Finnish society is stronger among the group with good Finnish language skills and among Finnish citizens. However, these are group differences observed in cross‑sectional data, and the independent effects of these partly overlapping background variables cannot be separated on the basis of the data.

Respondents’ own definitions of successful integration support a multidimensional interpretation. In the content analysis of open‑ended responses (N=892), the most common themes were work and financial self-sufficiency (58%) as well as language and functional language skills (57%). Alongside these, social relations and interaction (39%), culture, norms and adaptation (24%), as well as belonging, well-being and life stabilisation (18%) emerged. In respondents’ definitions, successful integration is not limited solely to work and language skills.

In the separate analysis of young people (N=211), too, feeling at home locally, the experience of being part of Finnish society and belonging to the Russian‑speaking community show different distributions: 77% feel at home in their residential area, 57% feel they are part of Finnish society and 37% feel they belong to the Russian-speaking community in Finland.

Trust is strongly target‑specific

It is not justified to describe trust as a single, general attitude towards Finnish society. Respondents’ assessments vary strongly by institution.

Eighty per cent of respondents strongly trust the police and 72% the education system. The corresponding proportion for municipal government is 55%, for the healthcare system 43%, for Finnish media 36% and for NATO 15%. The proportion of those who are unable to evaluate an institution also varies considerably.

When examined by length of residence, the results for belonging to society and institutional trust do not develop in the same way. Those who have lived in Finland longer experience several dimensions of inclusion and belonging more strongly, but their trust in several institutions does not increase correspondingly and is lower in the case of some institutions.

Trust directed towards Finnish media is connected to several other views. Those with strong trust in the media accept economic sanctions more often, consider Russia’s military action justified less often, and feel that NATO membership strengthens their sense of security more often than those with weak trust in the media. However, the connection does not extend to all questions: for example, worry about the expansion of the war is at almost the same level across media trust groups.

There is internal variation in views related to Russia and security policy

The justification of Russia’s military action, NATO membership, economic sanctions directed against Russia and the closure of the eastern border produce different response distributions.

Two thirds (66%) of respondents consider Russia’s military action in Ukraine unjustified and 10% consider it justified. Over half (54%) of respondents assess NATO membership as neutral regarding their own sense of security. Economic sanctions directed against Russia are accepted by 21%, despite the harm caused to Finland, while 55% disagree. About two in three respondents consider the closure of the eastern border to be wrong.

Examination at the respondent level also illustrates that different security policy stances can combine with each other in different ways. Of those respondents who had answered all three questions concerning the justification of Russia’s military action, the closure of the eastern border and the security impact of NATO membership (N=684), only 28% combined three views: Russia’s military action was not considered justified, the closure of the eastern border was considered wrong, and NATO membership was assessed as having no impact on the respondent’s sense of security. Respondents’ security policy stances therefore do not form a single cohesive whole.

In the question concerning the eastern border, the respondent’s life situation is additionally strongly connected to the assessment of the decision. Of those whose lives had been affected a lot by the closure of the border, 80% considered the decision wrong. Of those whose lives were not affected by it, 48% considered the decision right. It is therefore not justified to interpret the stance concerning the border solely as a general view on Russia or security policy.

In the separate analysis of young people, 81% did not consider Russia’s military action in Ukraine justified, but in assessments concerning economic sanctions and the security impact of NATO membership, 20–29‑year-old Russian speakers are clearly closer to older Russian speakers than to respondents of the same age in Citizens’ Pulse.

The results highlight the internal variation among Russian speakers living in Finland. Results regarding belonging to society, trust and security policy views vary depending on the question, and it is not justified to summarise the population group’s relationship with Finnish society on the basis of a single indicator or view.