Results: Separate analysis of young people

In the 2026 survey, the views of Russian‑speaking 20–29-year-olds were examined separately using an additional sample of young people. Of the respondents in the core sample, 165 were of this age, and the data were supplemented with an additional sample yielding 50 respondents. In quality control, four interviews from the core sample were removed because, based on the interviewer’s concluding notes, the respondent was a spouse or parent, and it could not be verified from the data whether the relative acted merely as an interpreter or answered on behalf of the young person selected for the sample. The final dataset for young people thus comprises 211 respondents: 161 from the core sample and 50 from the additional sample. The dataset for young people has not been weighted, and the number of respondents varies by question.

In internal background‑group comparisons of young people, some groups are small, which is why these results are examined as descriptive. In connection with small groups, the number of respondents is reported, and far-reaching conclusions are not drawn on the basis of individual percentage differences.

The aim of the separate analysis is to assess both the position of young people within the Russian‑speaking population and the extent to which their views resemble the views of the population of the same age in the Citizens’ Pulse. Comparisons are made question by question, as young people do not form a homogeneous group and similarities observed in one matter cannot be generalised to cover their relationship with society as a whole. The Citizens’ Pulse comparison must furthermore be interpreted as indicative due to the surveys’ differing sampling methods, data collection methods, response languages and weightings.

Attachment to Finnish society is stronger than political agency

Young people’s assessments of their own position in Finland are in many respects positive. Seventy‑seven per cent feel at home in their own residential area and 79% feel that they can express their opinions openly. Fifty-seven per cent feel they are part of Finnish society and 66% feel they are in an equal position with Finns. The wish to be living in Finland in ten years’ time was reported by 143 young people, i.e. 68% of respondents.
Assessments concerning political agency are clearly more divided. Forty‑four per cent have confidence in their ability to participate in politics in Finland, whilst a third disagree with the statement. Forty-nine per cent believe in Russian speakers’ opportunities to influence political decisions, and 43% of young people report following societal affairs in Finland actively. The experience of belonging to society and confidence in political participation are therefore not the same thing.

Nor does Russian as a registered native language signify a uniform community identity. Thirty‑seven per cent of young people feel they belong to the Russian-speaking community living in Finland, whilst 36% do not feel they belong to it. Among those who feel they are part of Finnish society, there are both those who belong to the Russian-speaking community and those who do not feel they belong to it. Belonging to Finland and belonging to the Russian-speaking community thus do not appear in the data as opposites of each other. This finding is consistent with previous research on young Russian-speaking people, in which identity and belonging have been found to be constructed simultaneously across multiple reference groups^[1] .

Experiences of belonging to society differ strongly according to the length of residence in Finland and citizenship. Of those who had lived in Finland for at most eight years, 29% felt they belonged to Finnish society, among those who had lived there for 9–15 years the figure was 64%, among those who had lived there for at least 16 years it was 81% (n=42), and among those born in Finland, 23 out of 26 felt they belonged to Finnish society. Of Finnish citizens, 75% felt this way, compared with 31% of those without Finnish citizenship. However, background factors overlap with one another, so the findings should be interpreted as group differences rather than independent effects of individual factors.

Young people’s trust, too, depends strongly on the institution

Young people’s institutional trust does not form a uniform picture of high or low trust. Eighty‑three per cent of young people have strong trust in the police and 77% in the education system. About two-thirds of those who provided an assessment have strong trust in the courts, municipal government and Finnish Defence Forces. By contrast, strong trust in the Finnish media is held by 41% and in NATO by 30% of those who were able to assess their trust. In the case of NATO, the number of respondents is clearly smaller than for the others: an assessment was given by 141 young people.

Compared with the Citizens’ Pulse, young people’s trust in the police, the education system and the courts is relatively close to the results for the general population of the same age. Clearer differences are concentrated on NATO, the media, the European Union and some questions measuring general trust. Institutional trust among young Russian‑speaking people cannot, therefore, be described as generally weaker than that of the general population; rather, the difference depends on the institution in question.

Practical trust in the authorities is also high among young people. Eighty‑three per cent of young people would trust instructions from the authorities in a crisis. This finding is important in relation to trust in the media: even among young people with low trust in the Finnish media, 24 out of 32 reported that they trust instructions from the authorities in a crisis. Low trust in the media does not therefore automatically mean general distrust towards Finnish authorities.

In security‑policy questions, young people are close to other Russian speakers in some respects and distinct from them in others

Young people’s views on security policy do not have a single consistent direction. Russia’s military action in Ukraine is not considered justified by 81% of young people, compared with 62% of Russian speakers aged 30 and over. Young people also oppose economic sanctions targeting Russia and the closure of the eastern border less frequently than the older Russian‑speaking group and trust instructions from the authorities in a crisis more often. In these questions, young people thus clearly differ from older Russian speakers.

On the other hand, in certain key security‑policy questions, the responses of young people are considerably closer to other Russian speakers than to respondents of the same age in the Citizens’ Pulse. Economic sanctions imposed on Russia by the EU are approved by 26% of Russian-speaking 20–29-year-olds and 21% of Russian-speaking 30–74-year-olds, whereas among 20–29-year-olds in the Citizens’ Pulse , 85% approve of the sanctions. NATO membership is felt to have strengthened the sense of security correspondingly by 16% of young Russian-speaking people, 18% of Russian-speaking 30–74-year-olds, and 65% of respondents of the same age in the Citizens’ Pulse. In these two questions, the views of young Russian-speaking people are therefore clearly closer to the rest of the Russian-speaking dataset than to respondents of the same age in the general population.

The same pattern does not, however, repeat itself in all questions. Young people reject the justification of Russia’s military action more often than older Russian speakers, trust instructions from the authorities in a crisis more often, and have a slightly less critical attitude towards the closure of the eastern border than the older group. Trust in the police and the education system, in turn, is close to the level of respondents of the same age in the Citizens’ Pulse. Young Russian‑speaking people are therefore not positioned consistently alongside either the older Russian-speaking population or the general population of the same age.

The respondent‑level examination of young people illustrates that a strong experience of belonging to society can be combined with diverse security-policy views. One can extract from the data a group of young people who ‘belong strongly to Finnish society’ and examine the responses given by this group to various questions. In the group of young people belonging strongly to Finnish society, the question-specific n varied between 116 and 120. Within this group of young people, 82% reject the justification of Russia’s military action and 85% would trust instructions from the authorities in a crisis. In the same group, 38% oppose economic sanctions and 48% consider the closure of the eastern border wrong. Belonging to society can thus be combined with both the acceptance of Finland’s security-policy solutions and criticism of them.

Young people form their own internally varying group

A key finding of the separate analysis of young people is that age alone does not structure Russian speakers’ societal views. In some security‑policy questions, the responses of 20–29-year-olds are very close to the responses of the older Russian-speaking population and far from the views of the general population of the same age. In other questions, by contrast, young people differ clearly from older Russian speakers or are positioned close to respondents of the same age in the Citizens’ Pulse.

It is therefore not justified to treat young Russian‑speaking people either as a younger equivalent of the rest of the Russian-speaking population or as a group whose views automatically approach those of the general population of the same age. Young people’s responses combine strong local and societal attachment, target-specific institutional trust, and mutually differing security-policy stances. The results also highlight internal variation within the group of young people.

^[1] Stasulane, A. (2024). Migration and Youth: The Lived Experiences of Russian Youth in Finland. Social Sciences, 13(4), 201.

^[2] Respondents aged 20–29 in the Citizens’ Pulse have been separated from the data to enable comparison. In public presentations of results, the youngest age group in the Citizens’ Pulse is 15–29‑year-olds.