Results: Current topics

The study once again aimed to provide a reliable picture of Russian‑speaking residents’ views on current issues in Finland and to explore how these views had evolved since the previous survey two years earlier. This subsection presents the findings on these issues.

All respondents were asked whether they feel that the war in Ukraine has caused discrimination or hate speech against them in Finland due to speaking the Russian language. A third of respondents feel this way (30%, Figure 28). The proportion of those who experienced discrimination increased for the third consecutive round: in 2022 17% and in 2024 26% of respondents felt this way. The proportion of those answering no correspondingly fell from 82% (2022) to 72% (2024) and further to 65%. In 2026, 5% of respondents did not know.

The clearest subgroup difference concerns gender: 35% of women and 24% of men reported having experienced discrimination or hate speech due to speaking Russian. By age group, experiences of discrimination were most common in the youngest age groups (20–29‑year-olds 34% and 30–39-year-olds 33%) and rarest in the oldest age group (70–85-year-olds 22%). Examined by length of residence, the proportion was highest among those who had lived in Finland for the shortest time (under two years 38%, although the group is very small, n=13) and 2 to 4 years (34%), whereas among those who had lived in the country for at least 16 years it was 28%.

The 2024 observation according to which discrimination was experienced more often among those who had lived in Finland longer therefore receives no support from the 2026 data.

The proportions of those who experienced discrimination vary by region: 41% of those living in Northern and Eastern Finland (n=143), 33% in Western Finland (n=112), 29% in Helsinki‑Uusimaa (n=518), and 25% in Southern Finland (n=230) reported having experienced discrimination or hate speech, while in the whole data the proportion is 30%.

The 2024 observation on the prevalence of perceived discrimination in Eastern and Northern Finland thus also receives support in this round.

Differences were also observed by citizenship: perceived discrimination was reported by 17% of Finnish citizens only (n=105), 33% of dual Finnish and Russian citizens (n=451) and 31% of Russian citizens only (n=265).

The survey included a battery asking respondents to assess their worry concerning current topics related to Russia’s actions. The scale used in assessing worry was 1 to 5, where 1 = not at all (worried) and 5 = very much (worried). The presented objects of worry assessment were drawn from the Citizens’ Pulse.

Below, the ratings given by Russian speakers on the level of worry are first presented as mean values (Figure 29) and distributions (Figure 30), after which internal differences among Russian‑speaking respondents in the assessment of worry are examined. The results are then compared with the results obtained from the Citizens’ Pulse concerning the general population’s experiences of worry regarding the same topics, and this comparison must again take into account differences in data collection between the surveys.

A total of 50% of respondents were fairly or very worried about the expansion of the war from Ukraine (Figure 30), and the mean for the statement was 3.4. Russian speakers were asked about their worry concerning the expansion of the war as early as 2022. In 2022, 51% of respondents were fairly or very worried, and in 2024 the proportion rose to 58%, so in 2026 the proportion was once again close to the 2022 level. The other topics of worry presented here were not asked about in 2022.

Thirty per cent were worried about Russia taking military action against Finland (mean 2.6) and 27% about Russia seeking to influence the functioning of Finnish society (mean 2.5). The means for all three concerns decreased from 2024.

It can thus be stated that Russian speakers are still worried about the expansion of the war from Ukraine, even if not as strongly as two years ago, and worry regarding Russia’s actions towards Finland has also fallen to a lower level than before.

Women experienced worry about the expansion of the war more often than men did (mean 3.5 versus 3.2), but regarding Russia taking military actions against Finland the genders were equally worried (2.6), and concerning Russia’s influence attempts men were even slightly more worried (2.5 versus 2.4).

Examined by age group, the concerns run in opposite directions: worry about the expansion of the war was greater in older age groups (20–39‑year-olds 3.2, over 40-year-olds 3.5–3.6), whereas worry concerning military actions and influence attempts directed at Finland was greater in younger groups (2.7 and 2.8 in the youngest age group, 2.3 and 2.4 in the oldest).

Differences according to length of residence are mainly small, and unlike in 2024, those who had lived in Finland the shortest time were not more worried than others: worry about the expansion of the war among those who had lived in the country for under two years was the lowest of all groups (2.8, n=13), whereas among those who had lived there for 2 to 4 years it was the highest (3.6). The result differs from the 2024 interpretation, which emphasised higher worry among those who had lived in the country for a short time: this was no longer observable.

Trust in the Finnish media was connected in particular with assessments concerning threats directed at Finland: those with strong trust in the media were more worried about Russia’s military actions against Finland (mean 2.9 versus 2.2 among those with weak trust) and influence attempts (2.9 versus 1.8). By contrast, the means concerning the expansion of the war were very close to each other across the different media trust groups.

The following (Figure 32) compares the views of Russian speakers and the general population (Citizens’ Pulse) on the level of worry regarding the presented topics.

Compared to the representative results for the general population in the Citizens’ Pulse (week 15/2026), Russian speakers were clearly more worried about the expansion of the war: 50% of Russian speakers felt fairly or very worried compared to 26% of the general population. On the other hand, Citizens’ Pulse respondents were in turn more worried about Russia’s endeavours to influence Finnish society (39% versus 27%).

The response distributions of Russian speakers and the general population also differ in that 36% of Russian speakers did not experience any worry about Russia’s military actions against Finland, whereas in the general population the proportion was 11%. However, the concentration of the Russian‑speaking distribution at the extremes of the scale is not a new phenomenon: in 2024, over half of those giving a numerical rating were positioned at scale values 1 or 5. Compared to 2024, the change is visible above all in that the proportion experiencing ‘not at all’ worry has increased and the proportion experiencing ‘very much’ worry has decreased.

The question concerning the impacts of NATO membership on the sense of security, which was new in the 2024 round, was repeated in 2026. The question is comparable to the corresponding question presented to the general population in the Citizens’ Pulse.

Over half of respondents estimated that Finland’s NATO membership does not affect their sense of security (54%, Figure 33). Seventeen per cent felt that NATO membership strengthens their sense of security (7% significantly and 10% somewhat), whereas for 29% it weakens it (16% significantly and 13% somewhat). Attitudes have thus become more neutral since 2024, when 42% estimated that membership has no effect on the sense of security, 21% felt it strengthens it, and 37% that it weakens it.

Particularly in older age groups and among those who had lived in Finland for a long time, the view that Finland’s NATO membership weakens the perceived sense of security was more pronounced: the proportion of those who felt membership significantly weakened the sense of security rose from 7% (20–29‑year-olds) to 25% (60–69-year-olds), and by length of residence from 0% (under two years) to 20% (at least 16 years); however, the group of those who had lived in the country for the shortest time is so small (n=12) that its proportion can be considered only indicative.

Correspondingly, the proportion of neutral responses fell from 63% to 40% with age.

Trust in the Finnish media is also clearly connected with the perceived impacts of NATO membership: among those with strong trust in the Finnish media (n=358), 14% felt that membership weakens their sense of security, whereas among those with weak trust (n=230) 54% felt this way. Of those with strong trust, 31% felt that membership strengthens the sense of security, compared to only 6% of those with weak trust.

The general population’s experiences reported in the Citizens’ Pulse concerning the impacts of NATO membership on the sense of security were clearly more positive compared to Russian speakers: a total of 71% estimated that the sense of security is strengthened (53% somewhat and 18% significantly), 21% felt that this had no effect, and only 9% estimated that their sense of security has weakened. Russian speakers’ corresponding distribution was 17% strengthening, 54% no effect, and 29% weakening; thus, the biggest difference concerns the proportion of those thinking neutrally and, on the other hand, those considering the sense of security to be strengthened: Russian speakers more often experience the impacts as neutral, the general population as positive. Ratings by respondents with strong trust in the Finnish media were also lower than those of the general population, even though this group experienced NATO as having the most positive impact on their sense of security among Russian speakers.

The 2026 results run in the same direction as the observations related to NATO membership made in the 2022 survey, even though the metrics used in different survey rounds are not directly comparable. In 2022, open‑ended responses from respondents who were worried about their own security or their loved ones’ security highlighted, among other things, fear of Finland joining NATO and worry about the deterioration of relations between Finland and Russia. In 2026, by contrast, trust directed at NATO was the lowest of all rated institutions, and NATO’s impact on the personal sense of security was also rated negatively more often than positively (cf. chapter 4.2). The metrics describe different matters, but the results indicate that reservations regarding NATO have persisted among Russian speakers.

In the 2026 round, respondents were presented with two statements concerning Finland’s actions in relation to Ukraine and Russia: receiving Ukrainian refugees and economic sanctions imposed by the EU on Russia. The statements were also presented to respondents in previous survey rounds in 2022 and 2024, and the statement concerning economic sanctions also appears in the Citizens’ Pulse. The statements were rated on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree.

In general, Russian speakers are on average fairly weakly in agreement with both presented statements (Figures 35 and 36). The mean for the statement concerning the reception of Ukrainian refugees was 2.9, and 32% of respondents agreed with it, while 37% disagreed and 31% were positioned in the middle of the scale. Attitudes towards the economic sanctions statement are clearly more negative still: the mean for the statement was 2.4, 21% of respondents agreed, and 55% disagreed. The means for both statements remained very stable over three survey rounds.

Older respondent groups are on average less in agreement with both statements. The mean for the statement concerning the reception of Ukrainian refugees falls from 3.3 (20–29‑year-olds) to 2.4 (60–69-year-olds), and approval of the economic sanctions statement from 2.7 to 2.2 (50–59-year-olds). However, in no age group were respondents particularly in agreement with the statements presented.

Those who are citizens of countries other than Finland, Russia, or Ukraine hold the most negative attitudes of all citizen groups towards the significant reception of Ukrainian refugees as well as economic sanctions.

The level of media trust is connected with the presented statements (Figure 37): Russian speakers with strong trust in the Finnish media are much more often in agreement with all the presented statements than those with weak trust in the Finnish media. A particularly large difference is seen in attitudes towards economic sanctions.

The mean concerning the sanctions statement rises from 1.4 (weak trust in the media) to 2.3 (moderate trust) and 3.1 (strong trust). Of those with weak trust in the Finnish media, 87% disagree with the sanctions statement and only 5% agree, whereas among those with strong trust in the media, 32% disagree and 42% agree. In the whole data, 55% disagree with sanctions and 21% agree (n=903).

As in the previous survey rounds, there remains a considerable difference between the general population (Citizens’ Pulse) and Russian‑speaking respondents in their attitudes towards economic sanctions (Figure 38). The Citizens’ Pulse survey conducted in week 15/2026 did not include a comparable question on the reception of Ukrainian refugees, so comparison with the general population can be made here only with regard to the statement on economic sanctions. The majority of the general population support the economic sanctions, and only 5 per cent strongly disagree, whereas among Russian‑speaking respondents the share who strongly disagree is 42 per cent.

In the 2026 survey, as in previous rounds, respondents were asked directly about their views on the justification of Russia’s military action in Ukraine. The question was identical to the one asked four and two years previously.

Two in three respondents did not consider Russia’s military action in Ukraine justified (Figure 39). The proportion of those who considered military action justified fell for the third consecutive round: from 18% (2022) to 13% (2024) and 10% (2026). At the same time, the proportion of negative responses remained unchanged at 66% (2024: 66%, 2022: 64%), meaning that the decline in the proportion of those considering military action justified has not shifted to those considering it unjustified, but rather to those with no opinion: respondents answering ‘don’t know’ accounted for 14% and those refusing to answer for 10%. In particular, refusals to answer have become more common, as this proportion was 6% in 2024 and 9% in 2022.

Examined by background variables, the results show, as in previous years, that the proportion of those who consider the war justified increases with age and, particularly strongly, with the length of residence in Finland. By age group, the proportion rises from 5% (aged 30–39) to 17% (aged 50–69). According to the length of residence, the difference is stark: among those who had lived in Finland for less than four years, 0–1% considered military action justified, compared with 16% of those who had lived in the country for at least 16 years. At the same time, the proportion of negative responses falls from 80% to 56%. The gender difference regarding justification is negligible (men 11%, women 10%), but women more frequently declined to answer the question or answered ‘don’t know’ (total 29% compared with 18% for men).

Regionally, the proportion of those considering military action justified is highest in Western Finland (18%) and lowest in Northern and Eastern Finland (6%); in Southern Finland the proportion is 12% and in Helsinki‑Uusimaa 9%.

The 2024 finding, according to which military action was more often considered justified in Eastern and Northern Finland, therefore does not hold true in the 2026 data.

Examined by level of education, the proportion of those who consider military action justified is highest among those with upper secondary education (13%) and lowest among those with a master’s degree or equivalent postgraduate qualification (8%).

Russia’s military action is considered justified by 27% of those with weak trust in the media, 7% of those with moderate trust, and only 3% of those with strong trust. Thus, similarly to the 2024 survey round, trust in the media is one of the factors differentiating views on the war in this survey round as well.

In 2026, respondents were also asked about the closure of the border between Finland and Russia. The topic is highly relevant for some respondents, and the open‑ended comments highlighted, in particular, the difficulties associated with meeting family members.

The border issue was addressed in the 2024 survey using a statement concerning the impact of measures taken by Finland at its border with Russia on the sense of security, but this statement was no longer included in 2026. In 2026, the topic was instead explored in greater depth by asking separately about the impact of the border closure on respondents’ own lives and about their assessment of whether the decision to close the border was right. The 2026 questions therefore measure different matters than the 2024 statement concerning the border, and a time series cannot be formed on the basis of them.

Half of the respondents reported that the border closure had affected their own lives a lot (50%). Some amount of impact was reported by 18% and very little by 9% of respondents. Just over a fifth (22%) assessed that the closure had had no impact at all on their own lives. Thus, two in three respondents felt that the border closure had affected their lives at least to some extent.

The decision to close the border was viewed with clear criticism. It was considered a very wrong decision by 37% and a fairly wrong decision by 27% of respondents, meaning that a total of 64% considered the decision wrong. The decision was considered fairly right by 17% and very right by 9%, meaning that a total of 26% of respondents considered the decision right. Nine per cent were unable to state their opinion.

The criticism regarding the border closure is consistent with the 2024 finding concerning border measures, at which time Russian speakers were significantly more critical than the general population regarding whether Finland’s actions at the Russian border strengthened their sense of security.

The criticism was clearly associated with the perceived personal impact of the border closure: among those whose lives had been affected a lot by the closure (n=501), 80% considered the decision wrong, whereas among those whose lives had not been affected at all by it (n=219), 48% considered the decision right. This finding is in line with previous research describing how restrictions on mobility between Finland and Russia affect, in particular, the maintenance of cross‑border family and kinship relations as well as other everyday mobility^[1] .

If they wished, respondents had the opportunity to comment freely on the topics discussed in the telephone interview in addition to the actual questions. In the 2026 round, an open, free‑form comment was left by 328 respondents out of 1,022, which is nearly one in three. The comments largely covered the closure of the eastern border, sanctions against Russia, and the war, as well as their impacts on respondents’ everyday lives.

The open comments were reviewed by theme, and the most common themes are presented below in order of frequency. It is important to note that most respondents did not leave an open comment at all, so this review reflects the views of about one third of respondents.

The border, sanctions and their impacts on everyday life

Clearly the most common theme was the closure of the eastern border and sanctions against Russia: the topic appeared in 103 comments, i.e. nearly a third of all open responses. The comments emphasised the personal impact of the border closure rather than security‑policy assessments.

The most recurring single concern was the prevention of meetings with family members and elderly parents. Several respondents stated that they travelled to Russia via third countries, which extends the journey to several days and increases costs.

We cannot see our loved ones because the borders are closed, we cannot receive our pensions, and this lowers our standard of living. Closing the borders is a very bad decision.

Another recurring perspective was the economic impact of the border closure. The comments assessed that the closed border has harmed Finland above all and particularly the eastern regions, where tourism and consequently jobs have declined.

In the comments, the border and sanctions were also linked to concrete benefit and service matters. Respondents of retirement age in particular reported problems related to the payment of pensions accrued from Russia, as the required certificates cannot be delivered.

Some of the commenters demanded that the border be opened specifically for residence permit holders and citizens living in Finland rather than broadly for everyone. This demand was justified by the argument that the border closure targets ordinary residents who are not to blame for the decisions.

Comments concerning the border and sanctions were not clearly divided into pro‑Russian and Russia-critical ones. The same comment might express a wish for the war to end while simultaneously viewing the border closure as a mistake directed at Finland’s own population.

The weight of the theme should be taken into account when interpreting the results: when respondents were given the opportunity to speak freely on any of the discussed topics, more respondents brought up the border and sanctions (103 comments) than the war itself (85 comments).

The war in Ukraine and views on its causes

The war and Ukraine were addressed in 85 comments. Views were clearly divergent: there were comments unequivocally condemning Russia’s actions, ones openly justifying them, as well as a number of comments seeing multiple parties at fault.

Comments justifying the war repeated the same arguments as in previous rounds: NATO enlargement, the actions of Ukraine or the United States, and the idea that Russia acted pre‑emptively. On the other hand, some commenters stated that they were helping Ukraine and Ukrainians personally or hoped for an end to the war and the normalisation of relations.

A significant proportion of comments discussing the war did not address justification at all, but instead expressed a wish for the war to end. In these comments, the impact of the war was manifested above all as uncertainty regarding the respondent’s everyday life and future plans.

Perceiving the survey as political and other themes that emerged

The third most common theme concerned the survey and the interview situation itself: the topic appeared in 100 comments. Some thanked the researchers for the study and considered it important that the views of Russian speakers are asked about, but comments considering the questions political or provocative were clearly more common.

Some respondents doubted the anonymity of the telephone interview and stated that they limited their answers for that reason. Russian citizenship was mentioned in several comments as a reason to decline to answer questions perceived as political. A recurring phenomenon was also disengagement from following these topics and discussing them: many stated that they do not follow the news at all. Some commenters described questions they perceived as political as sensitive and stated that they limited their answers because of them.

Other themes were clearly rarer: media and communication were discussed in 24 comments, immigration and foreigner policy in 19, integration, language and work in 15, and discrimination and attitudes towards Russian speakers in 12 comments.

In the responses of those who left a comment, the war was often linked to the border, sanctions and respondents’ everyday lives in Finland.

Experiences of discrimination:

• The proportion of those who had experienced discrimination or hate speech on the grounds of speaking Russian increased across three consecutive rounds: from 17% (2022) to 26% (2024) and 30% (2026).

Experience of worry:

• Worry about the expansion of the war from Ukraine has decreased since 2024 (58% → 50%) and is now almost at the 2022 level. Compared with the general population, Russian speakers are more worried about the expansion of the war.
• Worry about Russia’s actions against Finland also decreased. Worry about Russia’s actions against Finland remains moderate (military actions 30%, influence operations 27%), but regarding military actions it is now slightly more common than among the general population (25%).

Impacts of NATO membership on the sense of security:

• The impact of NATO on the sense of security is clearly more negative among Russian speakers than among the general population.
• The proportion of those with a neutral attitude has increased markedly: over half of Russian speakers (54%) felt that joining NATO has not affected their sense of security in either direction, whereas this proportion was 42% in 2024. At the same time, the proportion of those who felt that membership has a weakening effect on their sense of security fell from 37% to 29%.

Attitudes towards measures related to Russia and Ukraine

• Russian speakers continue to hold negative views on economic sanctions targeting Russia, which differs from the views of the general population.

Russia’s military action

• The proportion of those who consider Russia’s military action justified has fallen across three consecutive rounds: 18% (2022), 13% (2024) and 10% (2026). By contrast, the proportion of those refusing to answer has grown from 6% to 10%, and the proportion of negative responses has not increased (66%).

Closure of the eastern border:

• Criticism towards the closure of the eastern border was clearly associated with its perceived personal impact: those who experienced the effects of the border closure strongly in their own lives were particularly negative.

Topical issues currently prominent:

• The most common theme that preoccupied respondents was the closure of the eastern border and sanctions. After this, the most commented topic was the war. In addition, 100 comments addressed the survey itself: the questions were considered political or respondents expressed hesitation about answering.

^[1] Pöllänen, Havukainen & Davydova‑Minguet 2023; Eronen et al. 2024.