Outcomes: Current topics

One of the central goals of this study was to paint a reliable overall picture of the views of Russian speakers living in Finland on current societal topics and to examine the developments and changes in these views compared to the measurements taken two years ago. Some changes have been made to the questions compared to 2022, due to changes occurring in society. This subsection discusses the results of questions related to these current topics.

The survey included a battery asking respondents to assess their own concern regarding current topics related to Russia's actions. The scale used for the concern assessment ranged from 1 to 5, where 1 = not at all (concerned) and 5 = very much (concerned). The topics for concern assessment were taken from the Citizens’ Pulse survey, but two out of the three concerns being assessed were not included in the Russian Speakers in Finland 2022 study, making it impossible to conduct a time series comparison for them.

Below, the assessments of concern given by Russian speakers are first presented as averages (graph 29) and distributions (graph 30), followed by an examination of internal differences in concern assessment among Russian‑speaking respondents. After this, the results will be compared to the findings from the Citizens’ Pulse survey regarding the general population's experiences of concern about the same issues.

Overall, 58 per cent of respondents expressed moderate to high concern about the expansion of the war in Ukraine (graph 30). Concern about the expansion of the war was inquired among Russian speakers already in 2022. The proportion of those concerned has increased since 2022, when 51% of respondents reported being moderately or very concerned. Other concerns were not inquired about in 2022.

Thirty‑seven per cent were concerned about Russia taking military action against Finland, and 29 per cent were concerned about Russia attempting to influence the functioning of Finnish society. It can therefore be concluded that Russian speakers are concerned about the expansion of the war in Ukraine, but not as much about Russia's actions towards Finland: in the background, concern about the spread of the war from Ukraine to Russia may play a role (which has indeed occurred while this report is being written), whereas escalations related to Finland seem less likely. On the other hand, one might also consider whether the relatively low level of concern regarding Russia's attempts to influence Finland is affected by the fact that some respondents view these attempts as acceptable; in this case, it could be thought that there is no concern about them, even if they are considered likely.

Women expressed concern about both the expansion of the war and Russia's potential military actions against Finland more frequently than men. Those who had lived in Finland for less than two years expressed more concern about all the presented issues (the expansion of the war, Russia's military actions against Finland, and Russia's attempts to influence Finland) than other groups. However, the group's size is small compared to others, so the results should be viewed with caution. This suggests that there are likely individuals within the group of recent arrivals who oppose Russia's actions and have therefore moved away from Russia.

Throughout the study, the effects of media trust on other presented views and attitudes have been examined. Trust in Finnish media appears to have a clear connection to the levels of concern experienced as well: Russian speakers who have a high level of trust in Finnish media are, on average, significantly more concerned about all the presented issues (the expansion of the war, Russia's military actions against Finland, and Russia's attempts to influence Finland) than those who have low trust in Finnish media (graph 31).

The following graph (32) compares the views of Russian speakers and the overall population regarding the levels of concern about the presented issues.

Compared to the results representing the entire population in the Citizens’ Pulse survey, Russian speakers were clearly more concerned about the expansion of the war. On the other hand, respondents in the Citizens’ Pulse survey were more concerned about Russia's attempts to influence Finnish society. The differences in thinking appear logical: Russian speakers are more concerned about the expansion of the war because such an expansion would likely mean the war moving to Russia. In contrast, the rest of the population is more concerned about Russia's actions towards Finland, which Russian speakers, on average, do not find as alarming, as they do not perceive Russia as a similar threat to Finland.

Perception of concern

• Concern about the expansion of the war in Ukraine has increased. Compared to the entire population, Russian speakers are more concerned about the expansion of the war. Finnish speakers and Russian speakers likely perceive the expansion of the war differently. Russian speakers may fear that the war will move to Russia.
• In contrast, concern about Russia's actions towards Finland is not very high among Russian speakers.
• The expansion of the war from Ukraine causes the most concern, whereas attempts to influence Finland are the least concerning. It is contradictory that Russian speakers are concerned about the expansion of the war but not about Russia's influence or actions towards Finland.
• Those who trust Finnish media were more concerned about both the expansion of the war and Russia's actions towards Finland.

As a new question, respondents were asked about the effects of NATO membership on their sense of security compared to 2022. Finland's NATO membership came into effect on April 4, 2023, meaning that during the 2022 study, Finland's NATO membership had not yet materialized. The question is comparable to a similar question posed to the entire population in the Citizens’ Pulse survey.

Two out of five respondents assessed that Finland's NATO membership does not affect their sense of security (graph 33). Twenty‑one per cent felt that NATO membership strengthens their sense of security, while 37 per cent felt it weakened it.

Especially among older age groups and those who have lived in Finland for a long time, there is a strong perception that Finland's NATO membership weakens their sense of security. Trust in Finnish media is also related to the effects of NATO membership: among Russian speakers who have a high level of trust in Finnish media, only about 10% felt that NATO membership negatively affected their sense of security, whereas the corresponding figure among those with low trust in Finnish media was nearly 70%.

In the Citizens’ Pulse survey^[20] , the general population's experiences regarding the effects of NATO membership on their sense of security were clearly more positive compared to those of Russian speakers: overall, 76 per cent assessed that their sense of security had strengthened, 17 per cent felt that it had no effect, and only 8 per cent assessed that their sense of security had weakened. Among Russian speakers, there is no identifiable demographic or other group that perceives the effects of NATO membership on their sense of security in the same way as the general population according to the Citizens’ Pulse survey. The Russian speakers who trust Finnish media come closest to the general population's view on the effects of NATO membership on their sense of security, as mentioned above. Even this group's assessments of the effects of NATO membership are not as positive as the overall evaluation obtained from the general population in the Citizens’ Pulse survey.

The more negative attitude of Russian speakers towards Finland's NATO membership is not a surprising result; rather, it aligns with the general attitudes observed in the 2022 study. At that time, many respondents expressed their concerns about the effects of Finland's NATO membership on the relations between Finland and Russia. The results of this 2024 study confirm these previous findings, as trust related to NATO remains weak (see page 18 onwards). Additionally, as discussed in detail from page 47 onwards, many Russian‑speaking respondents feel that NATO is deliberately trying to influence them misleadingly, which increases distrust. The attitude of Russian speakers towards NATO may be rooted in the strongly held perception of NATO as a threat throughout the history and present of the Soviet Union and Russia, as well as a general opposition to the West. This historical background continues to influence the views of many Russian speakers, which explains their more negative attitude towards Finland's NATO membership compared to the rest of the population.

Effects of NATO membership on sense of security

• NATO's impact on the sense of security is clearly more negative among Russian speakers than in the overall population.
• On the other hand, a fairly large proportion of Russian speakers had a neutral stance, feeling that joining NATO has not affected their sense of security in either direction.
• Among those with low trust in Finnish media, NATO's impact on sense of security was clearly more negative than among those with high trust in Finnish media.

Respondents were presented with five statements regarding Finland's actions in relation to Ukraine and Russia, as well as concerning Russia's actions. Three of the statements were also presented to respondents in 2022. Four of the statements were also present in the Citizens’ Pulse survey. Comparisons of time series and to the views of the entire population are made where applicable. The statements were evaluated on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree.

In general, Russian speakers tend to disagree with the presented statements; there is particularly weak agreement that Ukraine should be supported more or that Finland's actions at the border with Russia would enhance the sense of security. Two out of three respondents feel that Finland's actions at the border with Russia do not enhance their sense of security (see graphs 35 and 36). Additionally, 59 per cent feel that Finland should not support Ukraine any more than it currently does.

The statements related to the reception of Ukrainian refugees, support for Ukraine, and economic sanctions against Russia were also presented to respondents in 2022. The average scores of the statements have not changed significantly since 2022.

Russian speakers in Eastern and Northern Finland have a more negative attitude towards border operations and increasing support for Ukraine compared to those living elsewhere. Older respondent groups are generally less in agreement with all the presented statements. However, no age group is particularly in agreement with the presented statements either.

The actions of Russia concern those who have lived in Finland for only a short time the most. However, these respondents do not strongly support the sanctions imposed against Russia or the support for Ukraine. Although this respondent group is concerned about Russia's actions and has likely partially left Russia in recent years due to those actions, they also do not strongly support the economic sanctions imposed against Russia, the reception of Ukrainian refugees, or support for Ukraine.

Assumed citizens of Estonia or Latvia (who reported being citizens of a country other than Finland, Russia, or Ukraine) have the most negative attitudes among different citizenship groups towards increasing support for Ukraine, significantly receiving Ukrainian refugees, and the economic sanctions. Only individuals with Russian citizenship have the most negative attitudes among different citizenship groups regarding whether Finland's actions at the border with Russia would enhance their own sense of security.

Trust in Finnish media is again clearly linked to the presented statements (see graph 37): Russian speakers who have strong trust in Finnish media are significantly more likely to agree with all the presented statements compared to those who have weak trust in Finnish media. The differences can be said to be significant in all statements, with a particularly large difference in attitudes towards economic sanctions.

While the respondents of the Citizens' Pulse generally agree to a large extent with all the statements, there is a significant difference between the two respondent groups in their attitudes, particularly regarding border operations and economic sanctions (see graph 38). Russian speakers have a distinctly more negative attitude towards Finland's actions at the border with Russia compared to the rest of the population: 10% of the respondents in the Citizens' Pulse do not see these actions enhancing their sense of security, while among Russian speakers, the corresponding percentage is 65%.

Although according to the result presented previously, Russian speakers are strongly committed to promoting the common good during crisis or emergency situations, supporting Ukraine may fall outside this commitment. This may be because they do not necessarily see the conflict in Ukraine as directly affecting their social status in Finland. Russian speakers may perceive themselves as neutral or external in this issue, which might give them a reason not to take a clear stance on assistance questions. This passivity or neutral attitude may, however, increase the sense of alienation among Russian speakers and raise suspicion among the majority population.

Attitudes towards measures related to Russia and Ukraine

• Russian speakers were very much at odds with the entire population regarding whether Finland's actions at the border with Russia enhance the sense of security. There was also strong criticism of border policy in the open responses. Border operations are likely also associated with travel restrictions. On the other hand, many members of the majority population are unlikely to feel that border measures affect them.
• There is a very large difference in attitudes towards economic sanctions against Russia depending on whether one trusts Finnish media: those with weak trust in Finnish media have a more negative attitude towards the sanctions.
• Assumed citizens of Estonia or Latvia have the most negative attitudes towards economic sanctions against Russia, the reception of Ukrainian refugees, and support for Ukraine.

The experiences of Russian speakers regarding intentionally misleading influence were inquired about in 2022, and the question was presented identically in 2024.

Just under a third of the respondents felt that their opinions had been intentionally influenced misleadingly (see graph 39). The majority of respondents did not share this view. Almost all of the respondents had an opinion on the matter. The proportions have not changed significantly since 2022.

Middle‑aged (30–60 years old) Russian speakers had experienced misleading influence significantly more often than younger and older age groups. Those with weak trust in Finnish media had also experienced misleading influence more often than those with better trust in Finnish media.

Respondents who had experienced intentional misleading influence were also asked which party they believed was behind it. NATO and Russia were named most frequently, with the proportion of those naming NATO having increased significantly since 2022. Similarly, a clearly greater number experienced influence as being carried out by Finland and Ukraine. All of the aforementioned parties were prominently mentioned in groups examined by different background variables, although there was some variation in the proportions. It can be noted that these four parties were often perceived as influential factors across various profiles of Russian speakers. For example, the experience that NATO is behind the misleading influence does not significantly decrease in any group. Even those respondents who have moved to Finland in recent years, likely largely due to the war in Ukraine, often see NATO as misleadingly influencing them, particularly if they have experienced misleading influence.

When considering trust in Finnish media, it is noted that those Russian speakers with strong trust in Finnish media evaluate Russia as being behind misleading influence more frequently than average, and less frequently see Finland, Ukraine, or NATO as being behind it. Media trust once again has a significant impact on experiences of misleading influence.

On the other hand, Finnish (or media from other countries) does not strongly emerge as one of the parties that respondents believe is attempting to influence their opinions misleadingly. In the question regarding media trust, it was observed that those with weak trust in the media sometimes assess that the media operates on the orders of the Finnish state or NATO, the United States, or the EU, and is “on a leash”. Thus, it can be assessed that the media is not seen as an independent misleading influencer, but rather as a tool or instrument that states or military alliances use to attempt to influence opinions misleadingly. There is a lack of trust in the media, but it is not seen as an inherently misleading influencer; rather, it is viewed as a passive platform that various parties driven by political and geopolitical interests utilize and control. The situation in Russia (and the Soviet Union) likely plays a role here, where the media is largely state‑controlled.

Experience of intentionally misleading influence

• Thirty-five per cent of the respondents feel that their opinions are being intentionally influenced misleadingly. The proportion has remained the same compared to the figure from two years ago.
• It is most commonly perceived that NATO is behind the influence. The number of mentions of NATO has increased dramatically compared to two years ago. It is almost as commonly perceived that Russia is behind the influence. It is also often perceived that Finland and Ukraine are behind the influence.
• NATO as the primary operator of intentionally misleading influence is an important observation. It is based on the Russian-speaking perspective of NATO as an entity aiming for disinformation, alongside states, which differs from the views of the entire population.
• The key difference from the previous research round is that now it is felt that “everyone” is striving for disinformation: NATO, Russia, Finland, Ukraine, whereas two years ago only Russia was emphasized among individual entities. In open responses, the perspective that “everyone lies” and “everyone has their own truth” is also emphasized. This is also supported by the observation that many respondents feel they are somewhere in the middle regarding the justification of Russia's military actions, rather than at the extremes of yes or no.

Similarly to 2022, this research round also directly asked respondents for their views on the justification of Russia's military actions in Ukraine. The question was posed identically to how it was two years ago.

Two out of three respondents did not consider Russia's military actions in Ukraine to be justified (see graph 41). The proportion of those who consider military actions to be justified has decreased since 2022, but there has been a shift especially among the indifferent (those who answered “I don’t know”). However, the opinion distributions are somewhat more complex than the quantitative response distribution suggests: the open comments left by the interviewees were examined in relation to their given responses on the justification of the war, revealing that the opinions of Russian speakers regarding the war include some shades of grey even among those who responded that they do not consider Russia's military actions in Ukraine to be justified. More details on these observations will be provided below.

When examined by background variables, it is observed that the proportion of those who consider the war to be justified increases with age, as well as with the length of residence in Finland. Regionally, military actions are considered justified more often in Eastern and Northern Finland than in other parts of the country. Lower‑educated individuals also consider military actions to be justified more often than those with higher education.

If desired, respondents had the opportunity to express their thoughts openly on the topics discussed during the phone interview, in addition to the actual questions. 340 out of 1000 respondents left an open‑ended comment. Most respondents provided comments on the war or related or consequential topics, allowing for an assessment of the underlying thoughts behind the results of the previously discussed question on the justification of the war based on the comments.

The open-ended comments were reviewed and grouped according to the responses the respondents had given to the question about the justification of Russia's military actions. The key findings from these perspectives will be discussed next, group by group. It is important to note that many respondents did not leave any open comments, so this analysis covers the opinions of only about one-third of those who participated in the study.

Comments from respondents who do not consider Russia's military actions to be justified

66% of respondents stated that they do not consider Russia's military actions in Ukraine to be justified. Of those who responded this way, 189 out of 651 respondents had left an open comment.

On the other hand, several comments expressed a general opposition to all wars, without specifically commenting on Russia's actions or any other specifics. There were also several comments that somehow brought up “mitigating circumstances”, as well as the blame of the USA or Western countries for the war, or expressed understanding for why Russia felt it had to invade Ukraine. It was often mentioned that there is opposition to sanctions against Russia or the border policy, and that Finland should focus on its own issues instead of those concerning Russia and Ukraine.

In addition to comments directly related to the war, this group also frequently highlighted the discrimination or other grievances experienced by Russian speakers/Russians, which were somehow a consequence of the war.

The interviews evoked some emotions and concerns among the respondents. Some were cautious in their responses, and some respondents preferred to refrain from answering questions if they did not have information on the topic, or did not want to respond to questions regarding Russia's actions. Some respondents found the questions too provocative and political.

When examining these open responses, it became clear that some of those who denied the justification of Russia's military actions reversed or softened their positions, indicating that it is perceived as difficult to take a clear stance on the matter. Respondents expressed their understanding of Russia's actions or otherwise indicated that the situation is complex and that multiple parties are to blame.

It can therefore be concluded that although 66% responded that they do not believe Russia's military actions are justified, this does not always mean a clear or unequivocal condemnation of Russia and its actions, or that the topic is perceived as particularly relevant or important.

Comments from respondents who consider Russia's military actions to be justified

13% of respondents considered Russia's military actions to be justified, and among them, 49 out of 124 respondents left an open comment.

These comments were quite unequivocally supportive and defensive of Russia: the comments justified in various ways why Russia had to invade Ukraine or simply emphasized strong personal support for Russia's actions.

Concrete reasons for the justification of the war included, among others, the rescue of the Donbass region, Ukraine's actions, and NATO's eastward expansion. Some of the comments were quite extreme in content.

In addition to direct comments about the war, this group also raised observations on other topics, such as the discrimination experienced by Russians in Finland and distrust towards Finnish authorities and the media.

Comments from respondents who do not know or do not want to answer whether they consider Russia's military actions to be justified

15% of respondents did not know whether they considered Russia's military actions in Ukraine to be justified, and an additional 6% did not want to answer the question. Among these respondents, 62 out of 145 and 34 out of 63 respondents left an open comment.

When examining the open responses from these groups, it becomes evident that many find the situation very complex or do not want to discuss the topic, as they consider it too political or provocative.

Several respondents believe that, in relation to the war, it is impossible to know the truth about the real state of affairs. A central phenomenon also appears to be a kind of disengagement from following, thinking about, or discussing these topics. It is often mentioned that they do not follow the news or any related information at all and consider it irrelevant. In these groups, there were also comments supporting Russia's actions or highlighting the culpability of Ukraine or, for example, the USA in the background of the war.

Based on the informal comments given by these two groups (those who don't know what to say and those who don't want to answer), it can be reasonably concluded that they generally do not consider Russia's actions condemnable or wrong. Thus, the proportion of Russian speakers justifying Russia's actions to some extent may be greater than what the quantitative question suggests (13% responded directly that they consider the actions justified).

Russia's military actions

• The proportion of those who respond that they consider Russia's military actions justified has decreased slightly. Instead, the proportion of “I don't know” respondents has increased slightly.
• From the open responses, it can be inferred that the majority of 'I don't know' respondents believe that the situation is complex and that the underlying reasons cannot be fully understood, or that they are simply not interested in political matters or do not feel capable of assessing the issue. Several emphasized their desire to remain neutral or noted that there are multiple culprits in the war, and some even stated that they understand Russia's actions.
• Based on the open comments provided by “I don't know” and “I don't want to answer” respondents, it can be stated that they are at least not on Ukraine's side or against Russia's actions.
• Overall, based on the open responses, it can be interpreted that there is a higher percentage of respondents who perceive an understanding of Russia's actions, recognize the culpability of Ukraine or the Western countries, and consider the situation complex, than the proportion of respondents who directly stated that they consider Russia's actions in Ukraine justified.