Outcomes: Inclusion and participation, trust and media

This subsection discusses the study's results concerning participation and integration, as well as social trust. These contents are primarily identical to those from the 2022 implementation. The section also includes new content that examines trust in media in greater depth.

Promotion of inclusion as part of integration is at the heart of the work of the Cultura Foundation. A person experiencing inclusion believes that they can have an impact on their personal matters as well as societal issues, which can manifest as trust and the experience of being equal and appreciated, for example. Inclusion increases well‑being and, inversely, social exclusion means being left out.

Social trust is also a key component of integration, internal security, resilience, and supply security. The trust of immigrant groups in the institutions of Finnish society has been considered an important research topic, and it has been noted that there are challenges in this area.

As the survey shows, for the Russian‑speaking population, media use and trust in media are strongly related, as the influence of Russian media on this group is significant. Trust in media and media usage habits thus impact social stability, the extent of disinformation, the use of reliable information, and the realization of democracy. Weak trust in media, in turn, increases social polarization, the spread of misinformation, and instability.

Statements regarding participation and integration were presented as identical to those from 2022. Respondents were asked to rate their opinions on the presented statements on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree (graph 7). The most commonly agreed statements were: I feel at home in my own neighbourhood and I can freely express my opinions and thoughts. Respondents rated their active following of Finnish social issues and their sense of being on equal footing with native Finns as the lowest.

It should be noted that the average scores for all statements related to participation and integration had decreased since 2022.

Graph 7 presents the average scores of all responses, while graph 8 shows the distribution of the responses. Following this, a comparison of the average response scores with the results from 2022 is presented in graph 9.

Examined through background variables, the results are overall consistent with those from 2022.

The length of a person’s stay in Finland affected several statements, if not always consistently: feeling like being a part of Finnish society grew stronger with years spent in Finland, while the experience of Finnish society as just was at its strongest among those who had only spent a little while in the country. Those who have lived in Finland for less than five years rated most positively their ability to openly express their opinions and thoughts.

Proficiency in Finnish is strongly related to how respondents perceive themselves as equal to native Finns and how well they feel they are part of Finnish society. Better Finnish skills were also connected to a more active following of societal matters.

Finnish citizens (both solely Finnish citizens and dual citizens) responded more positively to most of the presented statements than those who did not have Finnish citizenship. For example, respondents who only held Russian citizenship felt their equality with native Finns was the weakest. Respondents who held citizenship of another country (presumably mainly Estonia or Latvia) rated their following of Finnish social issues the lowest.

Finnish citizenship appears to be a clear distinguishing factor in respondents' experiences of participation and equality, and citizenship seems to have a positive significance in terms of integration into society.

Although good Finnish language skills and Finnish citizenship clearly appear to be related to the experience of equality, this does not mean, based on the responses, that society as a whole is perceived as just.

The experience of equality can be strong in personal interaction situations where respondents feel accepted and included. However, in a broader social context, respondents may feel that structural and institutional factors, such as public services, political discourse, or anti‑discrimination measures, are not just or equitable. In particular, Russian speakers may feel that their represented group faces discrimination or institutional injustice. Russian speakers may strongly identify with Russia, making them more sensitive to perceiving actions directed against Russia and the coverage of the war in Ukraine as negative and even offensive towards themselves.

This contradiction between experiences of equality and justice among those who have lived in Finland for a long time and speak Finnish well likely reflects the conflict between individual‑level experiences of equality and the perception of justice in societal structures: respondents may feel accepted as individuals, but on a broader scale, they may experience that societal structures do not treat their group equitably. Identification with Russia may exacerbate this gap.

The reasons for moving to Finland also had some impact on respondents' views: those who moved to Finland as children or teenagers with their parents rated nearly all the presented statements more positively than others, which makes sense given that they have lived in Finland since childhood or adolescence and have thus socialized into Finnish society.

The only notable difference between genders was found in the statement I feel I am a part of Finnish society, where women agreed more often than men.

This report will later present results regarding respondents' experiences of discrimination due to speaking Russian since the onset of the war in Ukraine, showing an increase in experiences of discrimination. Russian speakers have stated in several studies that they are discriminated against. In the FinMonik study conducted in 2018–2019 (Rask, Castaneda & Seppänen 2020), 32% of those with Russian and Soviet backgrounds aged 18–64 had experienced discrimination over the past 12 months. In the Fundamental Rights Barometer (2020), only one in four out of the overall population stated that they had experienced discrimination in their work or while looking for work over the past five years while nearly half (47%) of Russian speakers said the same. Furthermore, in the same study, 17% of Russian speakers stated that they had experienced discrimination in their everyday lives, at the store, café, restaurant or recreational or sporting facility in the past five years (Fundamental Rights Barometer 2020).

Studies have shown that experiences of discrimination weaken national identification in such a way that if a member of an ethnic minority experiences discrimination from the national majority, it diminishes their sense of belonging to a shared national identity (e.g., Finnish identity) (Jasinskaja‑Lahti et al. 2018).

Discrimination or grievances experienced by Russian speakers also emerged in several open responses collected in the Russian Speakers in Finland 2024 survey. The comments provided related to, among other things, discrimination experienced in the workplace, the general increase in discrimination faced by Russian speakers due to the war in Ukraine, and a more general negative attitude towards Russia. It is somewhat relevant to consider whether Finland's and Finns' attitudes and policies towards Russia are perceived as discrimination among Russian speakers. This impression emerges from the interview materials, and a similar phenomenon has been observable in various forms in previous studies as well.^[11] At the same time, it is important to emphasize that such considerations do not diminish the reality or significance of the discrimination experienced by Russian speakers, nor do they deny that genuine discrimination occurs.

It is also noteworthy that the phenomenon of discrimination experienced by Russian speakers is not new. Experiences of discrimination among Russian speakers have been highlighted in previous studies and in various forms, such as in the previously mentioned results of the Fundamental Rights Barometer (2020) and the FinMonik study (2019). Discrimination and negative attitudes towards Russian speakers have historically been linked not only to the challenges posed by the language barrier but also to political tensions, such as the annexation of Crimea and other actions taken by the Russian state. However, it is important to examine this phenomenon in a broader historical context. Prejudices against Russia and Russians have deep historical roots. For example, the Long Wrath (1570–1595) and other earlier conflicts with Russia laid the groundwork for mistrust, which has been passed down from generation to generation through later wars, such as the Winter War and the Continuation War. These historical experiences have partly shaped collective attitudes and prejudices that still persist. Current political events reinforce this historical legacy and create a complex, multilayered environment in which the integration and identification of Russian speakers within Finnish society may become more challenging. Experiences of discrimination at different times and in various contexts undermine the social inclusion of Russian speakers and can reinforce feelings of exclusion.

Based on the results of the Russian Speakers in Finland 2022 and 2024, as well as Cultura Foundation's long‑term experience working with the Russian-speaking community, many Russian speakers have expressed the view that Finnish media covers Russia's military actions in Ukraine excessively or unbalanced. Some Russian speakers perceive this as Russophobia and see the reporting on the war as a factor that exacerbates prejudices. Such views on war-related reporting can undermine the participation of Russian speakers in Finnish society and deepen the gap between the Russian-speaking population and the rest of the population.

Social inclusion

Freedom of opinion and staying up‑to-date on societal matters

Respondents in their fifties and sixties followed Finnish social issues somewhat more than younger and older age groups. Proficiency in Finnish also had a clear positive effect on following social issues.

Inclusion, participation and integration

• The trend is declining compared to two years ago in all statements related to participation and inclusion. The political situation in Finland has changed since two years ago, which may have an impact.
• Active following of Finnish societal issues is at the lowest level among the presented statements, which should be paid attention to.

Next, the survey will discuss the respondents' evaluations of their trust in different institutions or operators on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means that the respondent has no trust whatsoever in the institution in question and 5 means that the trust is very strong (graph 10). The used battery of questions is very similar to the one used in the Citizens’ Pulse survey conducted by the Prime Minister’s Office. This enables comparisons with the views of the overall population.

The strongest trust among the Russian‑speaking respondents was towards the Finnish police and military. Trust was also relatively high towards the education system and the justice system. In contrast, trust in NATO is notably low. Trust in Finnish media, the government, and political parties was rated as the second lowest. The trust of Russian speakers in all presented institutions has decreased since the 2022 measurement (with the exception of NATO, which was not evaluated in 2022).

Trust assessment was skipped if the respondent did not know the presented operator or institution or otherwise felt unable to evaluate their trust in it. This is why the number of respondents providing ratings varies by operator.

As seen in graph 12, the assessments of the reliability of institutions have generally decreased compared to 2022. The trust of Russian speakers in Finnish political parties and the Finnish government has decreased significantly (see graph 12).

In graph 13, the comparison of the proportions of respondents giving scores of 4–5 is presented between Russian‑speaking individuals and the respondents representing the entire population in the Citizens’ Pulse survey. In the Citizens’ Pulse survey, all operators or institutions received higher ratings, but the differences are particularly significant for NATO and the Finnish media.

It can therefore be stated that the trust of Russian speakers in the Finnish media and NATO is particularly low compared to the overall population. Russian speakers clearly trust the healthcare system less than the overall population.

Russian speakers, therefore, generally trust less in the institutions of Finnish society compared to the general population, and the magnitude of these differences varies between the different operators/institutions. It is important to note, however, that just as the trust among Russian speakers has generally declined, trust in certain societal operators among the entire population has also been on a downward trend lately. For Russian speakers, trust in all operators has decreased compared to the previous survey, but since the last survey was conducted in 2022, there is no recent perspective like that provided by the Citizens' Pulse on the latest developments. In the Citizens' Pulse, trust in the Finnish government, for example, has been lower in 2024 compared to previous years, and also trust in the healthcare system and education system has been on the decline. The decline in trust toward these operators/institutions can thus be assessed as being somewhat related to general societal and political changes, suggesting that it is not specifically a phenomenon related to the Russian‑speaking population.

However, in the most recent Citizens' Pulse survey conducted in June 2024, trust appears to have risen slightly among the entire population regarding all operators/institutions. Trust is constantly influenced by various social changes and developments. It is unclear whether a similar increase in trust is observable among the Russian‑speaking population after the decline, or if the weakening of trust will continue in their case. Obtaining such information would require more frequent measurements of trust within the Russian-speaking population as well.

A key observation related to trust is that trust in Finnish societal institutions and operators does not increase among Russian speakers over time: those who have lived in Finland for a shorter period tend to trust nearly all evaluated operators more than those who have lived in the country for a longer time. The length of time spent living in Finland does not, therefore, increase trust, but rather the opposite, as was also observed by Pitkänen, Saukkonen, and Westinen (2019b) in their study focused on the Helsinki metropolitan area. Those who have lived in Finland for over 15 years have particularly low trust in the Finnish media and NATO compared to those who have lived in the country for a shorter time, although trust in these operators is not very high in any group. Strong proficiency in the Finnish language also does not have a positive impact on trust.

One might think that trust in society would increase over time spent in the country, but this is not the case within this population group. Previous international studies^[12] have found that, for Russian-speaking immigrants, time spent in the country and learning the local language do not automatically increase trust if there are underlying ideological disagreements or views that conflict with the country’s institutions.

It should be noted that the reasons for moving to Finland in recent years for those coming from Russia may be very different from those who have lived in Finland for a long time. Many of them have likely left Russia due to dissatisfaction with the country’s political situation and actions, which may influence their more positive attitude towards Finland and its institutions. However, those who moved to Finland over 15 years ago constitute the largest group of Russian speakers (49.5% of respondents), and although their ideological positioning is often more conservative and closer to the official viewpoints of the Russian state, this large population group also includes variation and a significant number of individuals who have integrated well into Finnish society and adopted Finnish values.

Next, we will discuss the level of trust each entity has among Russian speakers in a bit more detail.

Police, Military, and NATO

The level of trust in the Finnish army was relatively high, although clearly lower than that of the general population, and trust had also decreased compared to measurements from two years ago. Other studies have not previously investigated Russian speakers' trust in the Finnish army. Instead, a difficult or complex attitude towards defence‑related issues concerning Finland has emerged.^[13]

An interesting observation in the results is the significant difference in trust towards the Finnish army compared to NATO, even though these two operators are largely part of the same organization on account of Finland's NATO membership. For Russian-speaking respondents, however, these two institutions appear clearly separate: trust in the Finnish army is high, while there is significant distrust towards NATO. Distrust or negativity towards NATO was also evident in other questions of the study. This distinction can be partly explained by historical and social factors. First of all, distrust towards NATO may stem from the fear that Russia could penalize Finland as a consequence of NATO membership. Secondly, the Finnish army is seen as somewhat "own" and a familiar institution because many Russian speakers have family members, especially children and descendants, who serve there, which enhances trust and emotional attachment to this institution. Thirdly, NATO is familiar to many Russian speakers who have lived in Finland for a long time as an operator comparable to a major power from the Soviet era – operator which has always been perceived as an enemy as part of the Cold War‑era indoctrination taught to Russian speakers. A similar enemy perception is especially present towards the United States.

Russian‑speaking respondents also rated their trust in the Finnish police as high, although this result had slightly decreased compared to two years ago. Trust in the police received the highest rating (4.3/5) among all the listed operators and institutions. Strong trust also permeated throughout the responses regardless of various background factors; no specific group emerged with low trust in the police. The strong trust Russian speakers have in the Finnish police is not a new observation as the phenomenon has also emerged before.^[14]

Nearly a third of respondents had not assessed their trust in the Finnish army. Unlike, for example, the Non‑Discrimination Ombudsman, whose assessment was often skipped due to unfamiliarity, in the case of the army, it is unlikely that the issue is actually the unfamiliarity of the operator. Thus, it can be assessed that some of the respondents did not want to evaluate their trust in the Finnish army for other reasons. The profiles of the respondents who skipped the evaluation were examined, and, compared to the entire dataset, these respondents are more often citizens of Russia or another country and, correspondingly, less often citizens of Finland. In addition, these individuals speak Finnish, on average, less proficiently compared to the entire dataset and are somewhat more likely to have lived in Finland for a shorter period of time. Based on these factors, it can be assumed that for some, skipping the evaluation may have been related to security concerns: respondents without Finnish citizenship may have felt that by expressing an opinion about the Finnish army, they could expose themselves to political or social risks, fearing reactions from either Russia or Finland.

The education system

Trust in the education system was fairly strong in the survey, even though Russian speakers have also expressed doubts about it on the basis previous studies. However, trust in the education system had also decreased compared to two years ago.

In a comparison between Russian speakers and the entire population, the trust in the education system is almost at the same level, meaning that the trust experienced by Russian speakers in the education system does not differ from that experienced by the entire population.

The Russian‑speaking population, like the respondents in this study, is generally well-educated on average. The level of education may partly explain the positive attitude towards the education system, as the significance of education in terms of individual opportunities and societal participation is widely recognized, which may influence Russian speakers' trust in the opportunities provided by education.

The justice system and the Non‑Discrimination Ombudsman

Trust in the legal system was high among Russian speakers, with 74% reporting that they trust the legal system. The level of trust in the legal system was on par with that of the entire population.

Trust in the Non‑Discrimination Ombudsman was assessed among Russian speakers for the first time, and trust in the Non-Indiscrimination Ombudsman is not surveyed for the entire population in the Citizens’ Pulse. Trust assessment was skipped if the respondent did not know the presented operator or institution or otherwise felt unable to evaluate their trust in it. For this reason, less than half of the respondents assessed their trust in the Non-Discrimination Ombudsman, as the operator was unfamiliar to many. The profiles of those who did not respond regarding the Non‑Discrimination Ombudsman were examined, and the group is characterized by slightly older respondents and those who speak Finnish less proficiently.

The trust in the Non‑Discrimination Ombudsman was assessed as fairly good on average by those respondents who provided an answer, with 66% of respondents stating that they trust the Non-Discrimination Ombudsman.

Healthcare

Also trust in healthcare among Russian speakers had decreased compared to two years ago. Now, 45% of people trusted the healthcare system. The gap in trust towards healthcare between Russian speakers and the entire population is significant.

The lower trust in healthcare among this population compared to others can be explained by various factors. This phenomenon of Russian speakers’ weak trust in Finnish healthcare has been previously identified and several possible explaining factors have been suggested in research literature.^[15] These include strangeness of the processes and service system, the language barrier and lacking availability of interpreters, long waiting times, experiences of discriminating or inappropriate treatment and dissatisfaction with the received treatment or examinations. For example, in the analysis of Kemppainen et al. (2020), 20% of Russian‑speaking women aged 50–64 felt that it was too difficult to get an appointment with a specialist doctor. Studies such as CHARM (Kemppainen et al. 2020) and FinMonik (Kuusio et al., eds., 2020) have observed that the needs of especially elderly Russian speakers are often inadequately met in healthcare services (see Kuusio, Lumme & Koponen 2020).

The opportunities and habits of using healthcare services in Russia, for example, probably also has an effect on how Finnish healthcare is perceived and experienced. Many Russian‑speaking immigrants travel to their country of origin or elsewhere in the Baltics, Russia or Eastern Europe to seek the healthcare services they need.^[16]

In the Russian Speakers in Finland 2024 survey, respondents were not asked about the reasons for their low trust in healthcare, but interviewers reported that mentions were made about issues such as long queues at health centres and language barriers.

Political parties, parliament and the government

The trust of Russian speakers in political parties, the parliament, and the government had significantly decreased compared to the measurement from two years ago. The change in trust towards these operators is the largest compared to all assessed institutions. Especially middle‑aged respondents have the lowest trust in these political institutions.

Compared to the entire population, the trust of Russian speakers in political parties is almost at the same level, but their trust in the parliament and government is clearly lower than the average in the population. In 2022, based on the then‑current measurements from the Citizens’ Pulse, the trust of Russian speakers in political parties was higher than the average in the population.

The results related to political power operators are consistent with observations regarding the political participation of Russian speakers, which has been found to be particularly low among this group. The representation index of Russian speakers in politics has been weak.^[17]

Media

According to the study, trust in Finnish media among Russian speakers is low and has further decreased since 2022. Only 34% of respondents reported trusting the media very or somewhat strongly, while 32% trust it very or somewhat weakly. There is a very large difference in the level of media trust compared to the entire population, of which 66% trust the media somewhat or very strongly (Citizens’ Pulse). Image 14 presents the trust of Russian speakers in the media in 2022 and 2024 compared to the opinions of the entire population. After this, the 2024 results on media trust are be presented by age group (graph 15) and by length of residence in the country (graph 16). The low trust of the Russian‑speaking population in Finnish media has been noted before.^[18]

Trust in Finnish media is particularly low among those who have lived in Finland for over 15 years. Proficiency in Finnish does not have an impact on the trust known towards the media.

An important observation from the survey results is that trust in Finnish media is clearly reflected in attitudes and opinions, as seen in graph 17: individuals who trust Finnish media clearly perceive Russia's military actions as less justified than average, have a more positive attitude towards supporting Ukraine and sanctions against Russia, and are more concerned about Russia's activities. Individuals who trust Finnish media also have a higher level of trust in all other societal institutions than the average.

Graph 17 presents the connection between media trust and various societal attitudes in the Finnish Russian Speakers 2024 follow‑up study. The graph illustrates how trust in the media affects attitudes regarding the EU's economic sanctions against Russia, the impacts of Finland's NATO membership on the sense of security, and Russia's military actions in Ukraine.

Media trust was seen as a central theme from the perspectives of both the Cultura Foundation and its partner, the National Emergency Supply Agency, so the topic was deepened with an open question posed to some respondents.

Respondents who rated their trust in Finnish media as low (giving a score of 1‑2) were asked a follow-up question about what undermines their trust. Similarly, those who had rated their trust in Finnish media as high (giving a score of 4-5) were asked a follow-up question about what has influenced their strong trust in Finnish media.

Those who rated their trust in Finnish media as moderate (giving a score of 3) were not asked a follow‑up open question regarding their trust. Based on the examination of their other responses, it can, however, be suggested that the views of those with moderate trust in the media are divided and not as clear-cut.

Russian speakers with low trust in Finnish media

Russian speakers with low trust in Finnish media cited reasons for their distrust, such as the perception that Finnish media presents information in a one‑sided or non-objective manner, is full of propaganda, and is not independent. These respondents felt that Finnish media does not tell the whole truth or even that it lies and misleads. It was perceived to operate under the influence of the United States and NATO, and at their command.

These themes were perceived to manifest, for example, in the anti‑Russian sentiment and fear-mongering about Russia, as well as in the way the war is reported. Respondents who experienced distrust also assessed that the opinions of ordinary people are ignored.

Russian speakers with low trust in Finnish media seem to compare the information presented by Finnish media with the information provided by media from other countries. The contradictions that arise from these generate distrust towards Finnish media, which is thus seen as distorting the truth. Studies have shown that following both Finnish and Russian media simultaneously is common among Russian speakers living in Finland (Viimaranta et al. 2018).

On the other hand, these respondents also expressed quite a bit of views on a more general and broader distrust that applies to all media in general, not just Finnish media. Opinions were expressed suggesting that all media in all countries are filled with propaganda and always serve the interests of their owners. It has previously been noted that many Russian speakers report having a critical attitude towards Russian media as well (Sotkasiira 2017), despite the fact that their other views in the same context may indicate the influence of Russian media.

The low media trust and criticism of Finnish media among Russian speakers have also been addressed in previous studies. It has been noted in these studies, among other things, that a critical attitude towards the actions of the Russian state leads some to perceive Finnish media as biased and anti‑Russian, as well as against Russians (Davydova-Minguet 2021; Oivo et al. 2021; Davydova-Minguet et al. 2019). Similarly, in the study by Pitkänen, Saukkonen, and Westinen (2019a, 48), 56% of Russian-speaking respondents living in the Helsinki metropolitan area agreed with the statement that Finnish media gives a negative image of representatives of their language minority.

However, among Russian speakers living in Finland, there is a strong principled appreciation for media that produces reliable information.^[19] Russian speakers may therefore consider media that produces reliable information to be important, but in light of this study, unfortunately, many of them do not see Finnish media as representing such.

Russian speakers who have a high level of trust in Finnish media

Conversely, respondents who regarded Finnish media as trustworthy most often described it as (primarily) objective, reporting things truthfully and without lying, and presenting issues from diverse perspectives. Respondents also justified their views with freedom of speech and media independence, as well as the fact that facts can be verified and are presented accurately and transparently. Trust assessments were also influenced by the perception of Finland as a democratic country and a rule of law, as well as the fact that the media does not appeal too much to emotions in its presentations.

Among those who trust Finnish media, many also made comparisons to other parts of the world. For these respondents, the comparison led to the conclusion that the information provided by Finnish media matched the information obtained from elsewhere, or it was perceived as more objective or reliable than, for example, Russian media.

Occasionally, it was also mentioned that mistakes in the news are corrected if they occur, and that there is no corruption in Finland. Some respondents felt validated by the fact that the information presented by the media aligned with their own views. Among the respondents, there were also a few who either work themselves or know someone who works in Finnish media, leading them to feel that they understand its operating principles.

Some respondents did not specifically justify the reliability of the media but stated that they generally trust Finnish society, trust Finns in general, or have a positive attitude toward everything in Finland.

Trust in Finnish institutions

• Trust has declined among the Russian-speaking population regarding all Finnish institutions.
• Trust in NATO is the lowest of all. There is also the greatest discrepancy in the level of trust regarding NATO compared to the overall population. Weak trust in NATO is influenced by the history of those born in Russia or the Soviet Union, as well as the perceptions of NATO that are repeated in Russian media and societal discussions.
• The second largest discrepancy in trust between the Russian-speaking population and the overall population is regarding Finnish media.
• The Citizens' Pulse survey also indicates that overall trust in various institutions has declined among the population, making the decrease in trust among the Russian-speaking community logical as well. However, the initial level of trust experienced by these two comparison groups has been at different levels, and therefore the situation is clearly more concerning for the Russian-speaking community.

Trust in Finnish media

• The trust of Russian speakers in Finnish media is weak compared to the entire population.
• The trust has also decreased compared to the measurement from two years ago.
• Trust in the media was particularly weak among those who had lived in Finland for over 16 years, middle-aged people, and those with lower levels of education.
• The Finnish media was considered unreliable, particularly because it is seen as presenting one-sided information, acting propagandistically, covering up the truth, and lying. The Finnish media is also often perceived as being influenced by the United States, NATO, and others, and acting under their direction. Anti-Russian sentiment, fearmongering about Russia, and Russophobia in the Finnish media are recurring themes in response
• A key issue also seems to be the comparison of information presented by the Finnish media with that provided by media from other countries (presumably, for example, Russia), highlighting -> contradictions -> and fostering distrust toward the Finnish media, which is consequently seen as lying.
• Those respondents who, on the other hand, have high trust in the Finnish media emphasized its objectivity, truthful reporting, and presentation of many different perspectives. These respondents also emphasized the comparative aspect, either with the media they perceive as propagandistic in Russia or, on the other hand, the possibility of comparison with other media whose information aligns with that of the Finnish media and thus supports each other.

A question about the most followed news media was included as a new topic for evaluation in the study. The interviewees were asked to freely name the three news media they follow the most, and the interviewers categorized the mentioned media as described below. The interviewees were not given a list of categories or news media options; instead, they were asked to spontaneously name the media they follow the most.

The overwhelmingly most followed news media was Yle news, followed by 63 per cent of respondents (graph 18). Next most followed were international media (27%), Russian media (25%), and media that has fled from Russia (25%). Russian media refers to media produced in Russia that adheres to the perspective and narrative of the Russian state, while media that has fled from Russia primarily consists of opposition media that opposes the actions of Russia.

Novosti Yle was mentioned by 22 per cent of respondents, but it can be assumed that some of those who generically mentioned Yle may have also been referring to Novosti Yle.

Older respondents followed Russian media more frequently than younger respondents, while they followed international media, media that has fled from Russia, and Yle news less often. Those who have lived in Finland for a long time followed Russian media relatively more often than those who have lived in Finland for a shorter period. Whereas younger age groups follow more often Novosti Yle, international media, and media that has fled from Russia.

The significance of Novosti Yle and international media as news sources is emphasized among those respondents who have weak Finnish language skills. Novosti Yle is also emphasized among those who have lived in Finland for a short time. In the gender analysis, men followed international media more often than women, while women followed Yle news, Helsingin Sanomat, and regional newspapers more often.

In addition to following news media, trust in individual listed news outlets was evaluated on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = very unreliable and 5 = very reliable. Trust in individual news outlets was compared, where applicable, to the corresponding results of the Uutisarvostukset 2023 study conducted by Yle.

The trust of Russian speakers in the presented news media remained consistently below an average of 3.5. Respondents most frequently considered Yle news to be the most reliable media outlet (graph 19). Helsingin Sanomat, regional newspapers, and Novosti Yle were also rated relatively high in terms of reliability.

Media that has fled from Russia was rated on average at a similar level of reliability as Finnish news media, while Russian (state) media was rated significantly lower in terms of reliability.

The given averages only include responses that provided a numeric rating, so respondents who answered “I don't know” are not represented in the counts used to calculate the averages shown in graph 19. Instead, the distributions of the given responses (both numeric ratings and “I don't know” answers) are shown below in graph 20. There were a significant number of “I don't know” responses; for example, the majority of respondents were unable to assess the reliability of MTV as a news media outlet.

An interesting result regarding trust is that, for example, among Russian speakers who consider Yle an important news source, just over half rate their trust in it as high. Trust and media usage do not seem to go hand in hand.

Generally, it seems that those who have lived in Finland for a longer time trust several Finnish news media less than other groups, while they have a stronger trust in Russian media. Among age groups, middle‑aged respondents have less trust in almost all presented news media compared to other age groups, while, compared to others, the oldest age groups have lower trust in media that has fled from Russia.

Next, the results of a study conducted by Yle, which targeted the entire population of Finland, are compared in the following graph 22. The comparison shows the proportion of respondents who rated their trust as moderate or very strong (responses 4–5). In Yle's study, Helsingin Sanomat, regional newspapers, and tabloid newspapers were evaluated separately. Russian media or media that has fled from Russia were not evaluated in Yle's study, so comparisons cannot be made for these.

There appears to be a clear difference between the entire population and Russian speakers in the proportions of those with high trust in all the comparable media presented. However, it should be noted that a large proportion of Russian speakers were unable to assess their trust in the presented media, which naturally results in lower proportions of those with high trust. It can therefore be stated that the proportion of those with strong trust among Russian speakers is clearly lower than that of the entire population for the presented media. However, it cannot be claimed that the remaining proportion trusts these media generally weakly; rather, it also includes a significant group of those who were unable to assess their own trust.

Media usage and trust in different news outlets

• Clearly, Yle is the most followed media outlet. However, the trust placed in Yle is not very high. Only just over half of those who named Yle as one of their most followed news media outlets rated that they trust it.
• Russian media is followed most in Northern and Eastern Finland, among older age groups, and among those who have lived in Finland for a long time. Overall, Russian media has also received low ratings in terms of trust. In the open responses, a recurring view is expressed that “all media” lie and are full of propaganda.
• Those who have lived in Finland the longest trust Russian media better than other groups, while, compared to other groups, they have lower trust in Finnish news media and media that has fled from Russia.
• Trust in Finnish or Russian media partially excludes each other: individuals with lower trust in Finnish media tend to have higher trust in Russian media, while those with higher trust in Finnish media tend to have lower trust in Russian media.
• Trust in individual Finnish news media outlets is overall clearly weaker than among the entire population.