Results: Assessment of trust

Next, Russian speakers’ trust is examined in relation to the trust of the general population, measured according to the Citizens’ Pulse survey by the Prime Minister’s Office. The extremes of the scales correspond to each other in wording, but the numerical scales differ: the Russian Speakers in Finland study used a scale of 1–5 and Citizens’ Pulse a scale of 1–10. The comparison is therefore tentative.

Figure 17 compares the proportions of respondents who expressed strong trust between Russian speakers and respondents representing the general population in Citizens’ Pulse. In the Russian Speakers in Finland 2026 data, strong trust refers to scale values 4–5 and in Citizens’ Pulse to values 7–10.

The comparison with Citizens’ Pulse shows that Russian speakers’ trust is lower than that of the general population in the case of several institutions. In the Citizens’ Pulse measurement, all institutions received higher ratings, but the differences are particularly large for NATO and the Finnish media, towards which Russian speakers’ trust is clearly lower. Trust in the healthcare system is also lower among Russian speakers than among the general population according to Citizens’ Pulse.

The proportion of those who trust the compared institutions fairly strongly was smaller among Russian speakers across all items, and the magnitude of the differences varies between institutions. Citizens’ Pulse measurements have been carried out more frequently than the Russian Speakers in Finland studies, so changes in trust among the general population can be seen over shorter intervals: for example, trust among the general population in the Finnish Government declined in 2024 and again in late 2025. In the general population, trust in NATO has declined continuously, although it is still at a higher level than among Russian speakers.

Trust in each institution among Russian speakers is discussed in slightly more detail below.

Trust in the Finnish Defence Forces was fairly high on average (3.9), although clearly lower than among the general population, as 88% of respondents in the general population trust the Finnish Defence Forces quite a lot or completely, compared with 45% of Russian speakers.

Thirty‑five per cent of respondents declined to assess their trust in the Finnish Defence Forces, which is the largest proportion among all the institutions evaluated. Unlike with the European Union or NATO, for example, it is unlikely that unfamiliarity with the Finnish Defence Forces explains this. The data do not reveal why the assessment was omitted.
The profiles of respondents who skipped the evaluation were examined, and compared with the overall sample, these respondents are more frequently citizens of only Russia or another country and correspondingly less frequently Finnish citizens. In addition, compared with the whole sample, these individuals spoke Finnish less fluently on average and had lived in Finland for a slightly shorter time. A corresponding phenomenon regarding non‑responses concerning the Finnish Defence Forces was also observed in the 2024 survey round.

As was also observable in the previous survey round, trust in the Finnish Defence Forces is therefore considerably stronger than trust in the NATO defence alliance: trust in the Finnish Defence Forces is high, whereas significant distrust is directed at NATO. Among Russian‑speaking respondents, only 15% trusted NATO (values 4 and 5), while 41% had weak or no trust (values 2 and 1). Twenty-eight per cent of respondents were unable to assess their trust in NATO, which is the second-highest proportion of ‘don’t know’ responses after the Finnish Defence Forces.

Russian‑speaking respondents also continued to rate their trust in the Finnish police as high. Trust in the police received the highest mean (4.2) of all the listed institutions, and 80% of respondents rated their trust as strong. Only 6% rated their trust as weak. High trust is also fairly cross‑cutting when mirrored against respondents’ various background information; no particular group with weak trust in the police emerges.

Trust in the education system was fairly high, with the mean of trust ratings remaining at the 2024 level (4.0), and the rating is now the second‑highest of all the institutions presented. The share of those with strong trust is 72%, and those with weak or no trust only 5%.

In a comparison between Russian speakers and the general population, trust in the education system is only slightly lower, meaning that the trust experienced by Russian speakers in the education system does not differ to any significant extent from that experienced by the general population.

Trust in the courts remained high among Russian speakers: the mean was 3.8, and 49% of respondents rated their trust as strong. The designation of the institution changed in the 2026 round from ‘the Finnish justice system’ to ‘Courts in Finland’, which should be taken into account when examining the time series.

In the 2026 round, municipal government in Finland and the European Union were added as new institutions to be evaluated, while the Non‑Discrimination Ombudsman was removed. Trust in municipal government proved to be fairly strong: the mean was 3.7, and 55% of respondents rated their trust as strong. Municipal government thus ranks at the upper end of the evaluated institutions, immediately after the police, the education system, the Finnish Defence Forces and the courts. The proportion of those who trust municipal government is only 5 percentage points lower among Russian speakers than among the general population.

By contrast, the European Union received the second‑lowest mean among the evaluated institutions, at 2.9. Only trust in NATO was lower than this. Trust in the European Union is divided in the data: roughly a third trust the EU strongly, just under a third a little, and just over a quarter fall in the middle of the scale. Trust is clearly higher in the youngest age groups than in several older groups. Trust in the EU is connected to attitudes towards the economic sanctions imposed by the EU on Russia. Of those with weak trust in the EU, 82% disagreed with accepting the economic sanctions imposed by the EU on Russia even if they harmed Finland (the statement is presented in more detail later in this report), and 6% agreed. Among those with strong trust in the EU, the corresponding proportions were 24% and 47% (N=787). However, it cannot be concluded from the data whether EU trust explains attitudes towards sanctions or vice versa, or what other factors are associated with the issue.

Russian speakers’ trust in healthcare remained at the 2024 level (3.3). The proportion of those with strong trust was 43%, and those with weak trust 19%. In practice, all respondents were familiar with healthcare as an institution in this context: only 2% declined to provide an assessment. However, healthcare clearly lags behind the police, the education system, the Finnish Defence Forces, the courts and municipal government in terms of trust. The gap between Russian speakers and the general population in trust in healthcare is clear, although trust in the healthcare system has also declined among the general population in recent years (trust has risen again since 2025). In previous studies by the Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare (THL), people with a Russian and Soviet background reported experiences of inadequate health services and factors complicating service use, such as a lack of information, long queues and language difficulties (Kuusio & Koponen 2023; Kuusio, Vehko & Aalto 2023). These findings also provide a potential background for the lower trust in healthcare.

Russian speakers’ trust in political parties, Parliament and the Government has stabilised at a fairly low level compared with other institutions: political parties 3.0, Parliament 3.1 and the Government 3.1. The decline in trust levels towards these institutions seen in 2024 thus did not continue. However, the level is still clearly lower than in 2022, when trust in all three institutions settled at a mean of 3.5–3.6.

In 2026, those with strong trust numbered 34% for the Government, 30% for Parliament and 22% for political parties. Political parties also stand out in that nearly a third of respondents (31%) were unable to assess their trust in them at all. Middle‑aged respondents in particular have the weakest trust in these political institutions.

According to Citizens’ Pulse, trust among the general population is also relatively low towards parties, but the proportion of those with strong trust is even smaller among Russian speakers. In 2022, the situation was the reverse: Russian speakers’ trust in parties was higher than in the general population, based on the Citizens’ Pulse measurement at the time. Russian speakers’ trust in Parliament and the Government is also clearly lower than in the population on average.

The results concerning political institutions are in line with findings concerning Russian speakers’ political participation, which has been noted to be particularly low among Russian speakers.

According to the study, trust in the Finnish media remains fairly low among Russian speakers. Thirty‑six per cent of respondents placed themselves at the upper end of the scale (values 4–5; 5 = trust completely) and 24% at the lower end (values 1–2; 1 = do not trust at all). The mean was 3.1, which is roughly the same as in the previous measurement. A significant difference in the level of media trust is observable compared with the general population, of whom 61% trust the media fairly or very strongly, according to Citizens’ Pulse. It must be kept in mind that the data is not fully comparable, as the indicators and data collection methods differ between the surveys.

There are minor differences in the level of media trust depending on how long the respondent has lived in Finland (Figure 18). Trust in the Finnish media was lowest among those who had lived in Finland for at least 16 years (mean 3.0), as seen in the table below.

By contrast, media trust did not differ consistently according to Finnish language proficiency. According to citizenship, the lowest mean was among citizens of only one country other than Finland or Russia (2.9; n=91). Level of education does not consistently differentiate media trust: the mean is highest among those with basic education (3.4, n=54) and those with a higher university degree (3.2, n=294) and lowest among those with a lower university degree (3.0, n=218). Differences between age groups are small.

An important finding from the survey results, already noted in the previous survey round in 2024, is that trust in the Finnish media is clearly connected to attitude and opinion questions. When respondents are divided into three groups according to media trust (weak 1–2, n=237; moderate 3, n=332; strong 4–5, n=367), there are large differences between the groups on several attitude and opinion questions, such as the justification of Russia’s military action, the acceptance of economic sanctions, and trust in Finnish institutions.

Individuals who trust the Finnish media also have higher‑than-average trust in other societal institutions: for example, the mean for Parliament rises from 2.2 to 3.8.

Factors influencing media trust were explored in greater depth through an open‑ended question presented to a portion of the respondents.

Respondents who gave a value of 1 or 2 for their trust in the Finnish media were asked what could influence them to perceive the Finnish media as reliable. This was answered by 208 people. Correspondingly, those who rated their trust in the Finnish media as strong (rating 4–5) were asked what could weaken their trust. This was answered by 321 people. The phrasing of the questions differs from the 2024 round, when both groups were asked about the reasons for their current level of trust.

The 2026 responses thus indicate, above all, what respondents expect from the media and, on the other hand, what they consider a threat to its reliability.

Those with moderate trust in the Finnish media (those giving a rating of 3) were not asked about their trust in more detail with a corresponding open‑ended question.

Russian speakers with weak trust in the Finnish media

Respondents who gave a value of 1 or 2 for their trust in the Finnish media most frequently named three things that could increase their trust in the media. The most common was the demand for verified and sourced information: 46 responses expressed a desire for facts, reliable sources and evidence to support claims. Almost as frequently, in 42 responses, a desire for less propaganda and political guidance was expressed, and 36 responses raised the need for different perspectives and impartiality. As individual wishes, respondents also mentioned increasing Russian‑language content and giving a voice to the Russian-speaking population in the media (six responses) as well as reporting dealing with everyday life and internal affairs in Finland (eight responses).

Criticism focused on the same themes as in previous survey rounds: reporting related to the war and Russia was considered one‑sided, and several felt that the views of ordinary people or those thinking differently are not let through. Roughly half of the responses (102) did not fit into any general theme, but instead contained individual wishes regarding, for example, headlines, media funding or channel availability.

Respondents described their needs and wishes as follows, for example:

A more impartial attitude: stating facts instead of made-up interpretations. If accusations are presented, there should be evidence to support them rather than made-up claims.
Reliable sources should always be presented to support information.

More verified information and less sensation, rumours and subsequent corrections.

Information must be examined from different perspectives; currently, news is presented fairly one-sidedly.

More objectivity and expert opinions, less propaganda.

If the media were more independent and examined more than one perspective and did not operate as they do now.

Information weighted in different directions should be presented about politics. Nowadays, many events are covered very one-sidedly.

Less propaganda and more information about the country’s own events rather than events outside it.

It is essential to give the Russian-speaking population the opportunity to express their opinions openly in the media.

The responses highlighted a wish for information to be compared against several independent sources. Some respondents also described contradictions between Finnish reporting and reporting published elsewhere. Respondents described these thoughts as follows, for example:

If only they would write the truth. I read information in different languages, and when I compare it, the information never matches.

Information should come from several independent sources and not be as biased as it is now.

Current news reporting is too one‑sided, and it contains a lot of unreliable information that needs to be checked from multiple sources to get an objective picture.

If only they would write the truth. I read in German and Russian, and often there is distorted information there.

There are too many lies, and the way reporting is done in Finland and Russia is too different.

Russian speakers with strong trust in the Finnish media

Those with strong trust in the Finnish media were asked what could weaken their trust. Clearly the most common threat was one‑sidedness: 94 responses mentioned bias, censorship, silence on certain topics or the narrowing of perspectives. The second most common was outright incorrect information: 42 responses raised lying, the falsification of information or the publication of unverified information and the subsequent corrections. The responses thus describe the conditions upon which current trust rests, in the respondents’ view.

A third recurring theme was the media’s ties to power: 36 responses mentioned political guidance, government influence, commissioned stories or changes in the media’s funding structure. Sensationalism, exaggeration and headlines that do not match the content were mentioned in 11 responses. Some respondents also described their trust as conditional regarding individual journalists or media outlets rather than the entire media landscape. Respondents described their views on potential situations that would weaken trust as follows, for example:

Due to the one-sided and not always objective treatment of problems, which is based on prejudices or clichés.

If negative things are avoided, certain topics are banned, if censorship occurs.

If I were to notice clear lying in a serious matter, fake news.

Because of incorrect facts and subsequent refutations, conclusions are sometimes drawn too hastily.

In ten responses, the negative portrayal of Russian speakers or discriminatory assessments were seen as a threat to trust, and some raised the discontinuation of Russian‑language editorial desks and cuts in Finnish news media. This finding is noteworthy because it comes precisely from those respondents who strongly trust the Finnish media.

Due to the closure of the Russian-language department in major Finnish news media (e.g. MTV3) and cuts to Russian-language departments in other media.

If the media were to transition to private funding; now funding is state-based.

Thirty‑five of the responses were in the form of ‘I can’t say’ or ‘I don’t know’, meaning that some of those with strong trust were unable to name anything that would shake that trust. In addition, 147 responses were so brief or isolated that they did not fit into any general theme; these mentioned, for example, the use of AI, the timeliness of news or individual media outlets.

In the 2026 survey round, respondents’ trust in other people was asked about for the first time. The question complements the institutional trust discussed earlier in this chapter with general, i.e. interpersonal, trust, which is considered a key indicator of social cohesion. Trust was assessed on a scale of 1–5, where 1 = no trust at all and 5 = very strong trust.

Of the options presented, respondents trust Finns the most (mean 3.5). Over half of respondents (53%) rated their trust in Finns as strong, giving a value of 4 or 5. Other people in general are trusted slightly less than this (mean 3.3, strong trust 43%).

It is noteworthy that the lowest trust is directed at Russian speakers: trust in Russian speakers living in Finland received a mean of 3.2, and the share of those with strong trust was the smallest of the three evaluated targets. This finding is in the same direction as the result for the new statement presented in the previous chapter, where the experience of belonging to the Russian‑speaking community received the lowest mean of the entire statement battery (3.1), although these indicators describe different things. Respondents thus trust Finns more than Russian speakers living in Finland.

Trust in Finnish institutions:

• The across-the-board decline in trust seen in 2024 has stopped, and ratings are mostly at the same level as in 2024. There was no return to the higher trust levels of 2022.
• Trust in NATO is the lowest among all evaluated institutions among Russian speakers: 15% have strong trust and 41% have weak trust (30% have no trust at all). Trust towards NATO has also fallen by two tenths since two years ago.
• Compared with Citizens’ Pulse, i.e. trust levels in the general population, the differences are large, particularly regarding NATO, the European Union and the media (comparison is indicative).
• Russian speakers’ trust in the Finnish media has remained fairly low: trust in the media averaged 3.1 in 2026, and the level is practically the same as in 2022 (3.1) and 2024 (3.0). Trust is clearly lower than the trust experienced by the general population as measured in Citizens’ Pulse.
• Trust in the media was lower in groups that had lived in Finland longer and lowest among those who had lived in Finland for at least 16 years.
• One-sided or biased reporting and the provision of incorrect information could weaken the trust of Russian speakers who have strong trust in the Finnish media. From the perspective of those with weak trust in the Finnish media, on the other hand, trust could be improved by the use of reliable sources and the proof of claims presented, as well as the eradication of ‘propaganda’ present in the media.

Trust in other people:

• On average, respondents trusted Finns more than Russian speakers living in Finland.